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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SECRETS DON’T MAKE FRIENDS, BUT THEY DO MAKE GOOD
BUSINESS: PERCEPTION VERSUS REALITY IN PHYSICIAN
FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PLANS

I. INTRODUCTION
Who can we trust? Even though physicians and patients appear
disgruntled over managed care reimbursement, courts recognize that costconserving measures are desirable and physician financial incentives may
operate as the least restrictive and most effective control. A balance must be
struck between the policy to control inflationary health-care costs and
physicians’ professional and ethical obligations.1 Forced to decide between
two competing policy concerns, United States Courts of Appeals seem willing
to accept the risk of lower quality health care in exchange for some constraint
on exploding health-care costs.
In bygone years, a patient could trust a physician to act solely in the
patient’s best interest. However, the complex world of third-party health-care
reimbursement has muddled the picture. Jeff, a fifty-five-year-old employee,
has worked for Company since he graduated from college thirty-three years
ago.2 In 1971, Jeff chose a local physician who submitted bills directly to his
insurance company following treatment. In the 1980s, Jeff saw his deductible
and co-pay increase as insurance companies tried to generate enough revenue
to offset expenditures. In the early 1990s, Company added a managed care
option to its health plan, whereby employees could reduce their out-of-pocket
expenditures simply by selecting a health-care provider from an approved list.
Make no mistake, many employees have remained with the same physician
throughout the reimbursement transformation. However, in early stages, an
incentive existed to provide the best possible care because health-care
primarily focused on the patient’s health and secondarily on maintaining the
physician’s practice and reputation.
Critics argue that the incentive
encouraged too much care and utter disregard for expenses. The institution of
managed care changed the health-care landscape because it placed the risk of
1. Oath of Hippocrates as adopted by SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/5594.html (last modified Mar. 7, 2002)
(“I will carry out that regimen which, according to my power and discernment, shall be for the
benefit of my patients; I will keep them from harm and wrong . . . I will maintain the utmost
respect for all human life.”).
2. Jeff is a fictional character, not intended to represent any one individual.
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loss and burden for “unnecessary” treatment on the physician. Today,
physicians not only worry about the patient’s ailments but also must juggle
multiple burdens that impact the physician’s own well-being.
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO)3 serve a dual purpose in that
they provide insurance and medical care under the theory that providing both
services through one entity encourages efficient use of scarce health-care
resources. HMOs commonly “encourage” their physicians to make decisions
that reduce costs to the HMO. Upon meeting objectives set by the HMO,
physicians receive a pecuniary bonus or incentive that may introduce
competing, if not adverse, interests affecting the physician’s treatment
decisions. The question therefore arises as to whether HMOs should be liable
for concealing information about physician reimbursement incentives while
shifting risk and burdens to physicians, all for the sake of profit.
In June 2003, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued the most recent
appellate decision regarding the extent to which disclosure requirements under
ERISA obligate an HMO to disclose financial incentives awarded to
physicians, Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc.4 Horvath involved a
beneficiary challenging disclosure practices of her HMO, alleging that
nondisclosure at enrollment and continued concealment of physician incentives
violated ERISA disclosure rules and diminished the value of the health plan to
employees (i.e., a diminished value theory).5 Horvath urged the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals to expand the disclosure requirements under ERISA one step
further than courts had previously been willing to go, but the court rejected
Horvath’s claim because it found that controlling exploding health-care costs
outweighed the protection that might be derived from expanding existing
ERISA disclosure rules.
Any examination of health law issues necessarily involves a consideration
of three elements permeating the analysis: access, cost, and quality. Adjusting
practice toward one factor may adversely affect the others. Part II of this
Comment will examine cost issues and the historical methods used in healthcare reimbursement that may include “out-of-pocket [expenditures], individual
health insurance, employment-based health insurance, and government
financing.”6 Each of these methods “attempted to solve the problem of
unaffordable care for certain groups,” but like using your fingers to plug a
dam, each attempt created new problems that contributed to the rapid increases

3. An HMO is “[a] group of participating healthcare providers that furnish medical services
to enrolled members of a group health-insurance plan.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 737 (8th ed.
2004).
4. 333 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2003).
5. Id. at 453.
6. Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Reimbursing Physicians and Hospitals, 272
JAMA 971, 971 (1994).
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in health-care costs.7 Sometimes inadvertently, but often intentionally,
traditional third-party payment systems created incentives to provide more
care, but payors sought to mold the behavior of the health-care providers. Part
III will examine quality issues through non-legal data such as survey and study
results examining physician and patient perceptions toward managed care
reimbursement. This Part reveals uneasiness, not necessarily toward the
reimbursement system, but toward the effects incentives have on physician
autonomy and patient trust. The discussion in Part IV focuses on statutory
ERISA analysis and common law clarifications for evaluating ERISA conflict
preemption and complete preemption for claims to recover benefits due under
an employee benefit plan (EBP).8 This section also examines common law and
statutory fiduciary relationships9 and the reasoning as to why HMOs, unlike
traditional insurance, may be regulated as an ERISA fiduciary.
Part V focuses the ERISA discussion by analyzing cases that have reached
the appellate level on incentive disclosure issues. United States Courts of
Appeals disagree about a fiduciary’s duties to disclose under ERISA. The
cases are Shea v. Esensten,10 McDonald v. Provident Indemnity Life Insurance
Co.,11 Ehlmann v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Texas,12 and Horvath v.
Keystone Health Plan East, Inc.13 Part VI analyzes the ramifications of these
four decisions and the additional insight that Horvath brings to an issue that
will likely be resolved by the Supreme Court in the not-so-distant future.
Finally, a brief conclusion addresses the balance that must be struck between
the social desire to keep health-care costs down contrasted with the risk of
7. Id.
8. Employee benefit plans covered by ERISA encompass “written stock-purchase, savings,
option, bonus, stock- appreciation, profit-sharing, thrift, incentive, pension, or similar plan solely
for employees, officers, and advisers of a company. The term includes an employee-welfare
benefit plan, an employee-pension benefit plan, or a combination of those two.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 564 (8th ed. 2004).
9. A fiduciary relationship is:
A relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of another on
matters within the scope of the relationship. Fiduciary relationships—such as trusteebeneficiary, guardian-ward, principal-agent, and attorney-client—require an unusually
high degree of care. Fiduciary relationships usu[ally] arise in one of four situations: (1)
when one person places trust in the faithful integrity of another, who as a result gains
superiority or influence over the first, (2) when one person assumes control and
responsibility over another, (3) when one person has a duty to act for or give advice to
another on matters falling within the scope of the relationship, or (4) when there is a
specific relationship that has traditionally been recognized as involving fiduciary
duties . . . .
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1315 (8th ed. 2004).
10. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
11. 60 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1995).
12. 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000).
13. 333 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2003).
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having uninformed consumers overpaying for coverage and receiving less than
ideal benefits from their HMO.
II. INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH-CARE REIMBURSEMENT
A.

Traditional Health-Care Reimbursement Structure

In the current health-care market, Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPO)14 enroll about half of all employees.15 HMOs provide coverage to
twenty-six percent of employees, while indemnity insurance covers only five
percent.16 HMOs exist to provide cost-efficient health care by supplying the
insurance, acting as administrator, and ultimately supplying medical services.
Typically, HMOs provide an employer with a plan for group coverage, with
premium payments being withheld from employees’ salaries. The relationship
between employer and HMO is the focus of this paper.
Physician reimbursement is nearly always determined by contract in one of
a number of combinations between doctor, hospital and/or managed care
organization. Prior to the rise of third-party insurance, physicians and
hospitals were paid under a “charged based” system, by which reimbursement
was paid for the services performed on a sliding scale, usually depending on
ability to pay.17 The expansion of health-care coverage following World War
II fostered the growth of private insurance, Blue Cross, and Blue Shield.18 In
the 1950s, the “Blues” attempted to regulate health-care costs by shifting from
a “charges” system to a system based on “usual, customary, and reasonable
reimbursement” (UCR), which paid the lowest of: 1) the actual bill charged to
patient (usual), 2) physician’s customary charge (customary), or 3) the
prevailing charge in that industry in that community (reasonable).19 In 1965,
Medicare and Medicaid adopted UCR reimbursement, but they have since
abandoned the system because the incentive under a UCR reimbursement

14. A PPO is “[a] group of healthcare providers (such as doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies)
that agree to provide medical services at a discounted cost to covered persons in a given
geographic area.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (8th ed. 2004).
15. HEALTH & RESEARCH EDUC. TRUST, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2002 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 3 (2002) [hereinafter EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS].
16. Id. at 4.
17. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
310 (1982).
18. See id. at 310–11. Blue Cross provided community insurance plans that covered hospital
charges. Id. at 313–14. Blue Shield provided insurance coverage for physician services. Id.
19. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-4(a)–(j) (2000); see
also ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 13 (1997).
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scheme encourages providers to continually increase actual charges, resulting
in inflated customary and reasonable charges.20
The next financing development implemented fee schedules to pay
physicians per procedure.21 Physicians submit bills under CPT codes,22 while
hospitals use DRG codes.23 Reimbursement is rendered for procedures,
regardless of whether the procedure was performed by a general practitioner or
a specialist. Under DRGs the incentive is to release the patient as early as
possible, while maintaining the proper standard of care.24 Lump sum payments
encourage efficient treatment because reimbursement is the same whether the
patient stays hospitalized for a week or a few hours. In 1992, Medicare
implemented payment for physician services based on a Resource-Based
Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), which pays on a fee-for-service basis by
establishing “a fee schedule for different classes of services adjusted
[geographically].”25 Fee-for-service reimbursement such as CPT, DRG, and
RBRVS remain useful forms of reimbursement for non-managed care patients.
B.

Managed Care Reimbursement

Managed Care Organizations (MCOs)26 proliferated in the 1980s and
1990s because of attempts by the insurance industry to contain exploding
costs.27 MCOs implemented three major organizational forms: fee-for-service
with utilization review, Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), and Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).28 HMOs constitute the most common
form of managed care and are characterized as insurers attempting to manage

20. Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 400 (1996).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(C) (billing based on time, intensity, skill, and stress
required by the physician to determine payment for a specific treatment).
22. “Current Procedural Terminology” is “[a] medical code set of physician and other
services, maintained and copyrighted by the American Medical Association (AMA), and adopted
by the Secretary of HHS as the standard for reporting physician and other services on standard
transactions.” CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., GLOSSARY, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/glossary (last modified July 16, 2004).
23. “Diagnosis-Related Groups” is “[a] classification system that groups patients according
to diagnosis, type of treatment, age, and other relevant criteria. Under the prospective payment
system, hospitals are paid a set fee for treating patients in a single DRG category, regardless of
the actual cost of care for the individual.” Id.
24. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 693–698 (4th ed. 2001).
25. Latham, supra note 20, at 400 n.5.
26. “Managed Care Organizations” (MCO) is an umbrella term for several types of managed
care organizations including Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMO), and Point of Service Option (PSO). See FURROW, supra note 24, at 509–
12; See also Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 971.
27. See generally Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
28. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 971.
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physician behavior through implementation of measures to control costs and
limit utilization of medical services.29
To understand the dynamics in managed care it is necessary to realize that
the largest third of managed care companies enroll eighty-one percent of the
HMO beneficiaries, while the smallest third enrolls only three percent of
beneficiaries.30 HMOs reimburse providers most often using capitation, but
other forms include negotiated fee-for-service arrangements, global budgets,31
and staff models.32
1.

The Preferred Form of Managed Care Reimbursement: Capitation
Payments

All managed care organizations depend on influencing physician practice,
either directly or indirectly through physician medical directors.33 HMOs
spread financial risk by implementing capitation payment systems, by which
providers are paid per enrollee for a specific period, regardless of services
rendered.34 Physicians receive the same payment per patient even if no
services are rendered during a period.35 Capitation in any form encourages
physicians to accept healthy patients who require little maintenance and to
avoid high risk/high cost patients.36 To control costs, patients are often
required to funnel all non-emergency care through the primary care physician,
who acts as a gatekeeper, determining when to refer the patient for specialist or
hospital care.37 Capitation payments may be distributed through either a two
or three-tiered reimbursement structure.
Capitation payments under a two-tiered reimbursement system38 are
established by contract between the HMO and individual physician by which
the physician receives a fixed payment for each patient under his care enrolled
with the HMO, regardless of services rendered.39 Two-tiered capitation
transfers financial risk to the health-care provider because the HMO is only
29. Latham, supra note 20, at 401.
30. See Joseph P. Newhouse & The Harvard Managed Care Industry Center Group,
Managed Care: An Industry Snapshot, 39 INQUIRY: THE J. OF HEALTH CARE ORG., PROVISION,
AND FIN. 1, 11 (2002).
31. The HMO pays one lump sum payment per period and the physician is responsible for
keeping costs under the global budget. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 976.
32. Staff model HMOs constitute a smaller percentage of managed care whereby physicians
are salaried employees of the HMO. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 971, 975.
33. See generally Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
34. See Latham, supra note 20, at 401.
35. See id. at 402.
36. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218–19.
37. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 973.
38. Id. (discussing that two-tiered capitation accounts for approximately twenty percent of
U.S. HMO plans).
39. Id.
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responsible for capitation payments, subject to a few exceptions.40 “Generally,
a dollar limit is placed on the physician’s risk such that excessive costs for an
extremely ill patient are covered by the HMO.”41 Two-tiered reimbursement
creates the most opportunity for conflicts of interest between physician and
patient because the physician’s personal income is directly proportional to the
amount of services he denies to patients.42
In three-tiered reimbursement systems, individual physicians join together
to create an Independent Practice Association (IPA), and the HMO pays a
lump sum to the IPA each period.43 Three-tier capitation reduces risk to
individual providers because the IPA allocates payment into two funds:
primary care services and hospitalization/specialty services.44 Providers
receive capitated payments for their primary practice based on the number of
enrollees, but “[t]he lower the use of diagnostic and specialist services, the
higher the year-end bonus for IPA physician gatekeepers.”45 Funds remaining
in the specialist’s fund at the end of a period are disbursed among providers as
a bonus, returned withholdings, or profit sharing.
Three-tier systems create fewer opportunities for conflicts of interest than
two-tier systems because outlier patients are absorbed into the risk pool and do
not wreak financial havoc on the individual physician’s personal welfare, only
his year-end bonus.46 Compared to two-tier capitation, three-tier capitation
creates a lesser conflict of interest because usually less than twenty percent of
the physician’s income depends on the amount of diagnostic and specialty
services utilized during the year.47
Results vary widely for capitation-based practices depending on the
number of physicians in the plan, contract language, size and demographic of
population served, geographic location, and utilization of resources.48 Reports
indicate that proper utilization of capitated payments allowed physician groups

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 973.
43. Cicio v. Does 1–8, 321 F.3d 83, 87 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003). The Cicio court defined an
independent practice association as:
[A] local physician group . . . comprised of physicians who are active on [a] hospital’s
medical staff and contract with a health maintenance organization . . . . [where]
physicians’ services are established with a relatively large number of generally small or
medium-sized group practices, with physicians receiving some type of discounted fee-forservice payment from the HMO, rather than . . . salaried reimbursement.
Id. (citations omitted).
44. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 974.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See generally id.
48. See generally Steven D. Pearson et al., Ethical Guidelines for Physician Compensation
Based on Capitation, 339 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 689 (1998).
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switching to capitated reimbursement to increase their income, in one year, to
150–170% of the amount they had earned caring for the same patients under
fee-for-service systems.49
2.

How Physician Financial Incentives Work

In order to encourage physicians to internalize costs for services and
referrals, HMOs implement three major types of incentives: bonuses,
withholds, and subcapitation.50 Financial incentives accompanying capitation
vary depending on the HMO and individual plan. Physicians receive bonuses,
the most common incentive type, for “good case-management technique,” by
which physicians may be rated in any number of categories including costefficiency, patient satisfaction, hours, patient encounters, and malpractice
experience.51 Withhold systems can vary widely but generally retain a
percentage of the capitated payment in a risk pool at the beginning of the
period that is used to pay for referrals and services beyond the capitated
budget.52 In 1996, seventy-two percent of network and IPA model HMOs
utilized bonuses or withholds to pay their primary care physicians.53
Subcapitation systems constitute the most complex incentives because
physicians (in groups or individually) contract with service providers
(laboratories, physical therapy) to provide all services at a fixed cost.54
The optimal incentive should be structured to avoid intense conflicts of
interest while making physicians more cost-conscious in diagnosis and
treatment.55 Several factors help determine intensity, including scope of
services included in the incentive, amount of potential financial gain or loss,
timing of the incentive, structure, and “stop-loss”56 provisions.57 Intensity of

49. Ken Terry, Surprise! Capitation Can Be a Boon, MED. ECON., Apr. 15, 1996, at 127–28.
See also Pearson, supra note 48, at 690.
50. Latham, supra note 20, at 403.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 404 (discussing increased effectiveness of withholds where the physician is
personally responsible for costs above the withhold); but cf. GERALD R. PETERS, HEALTHCARE
INTEGRATION: A LEGAL MANUAL FOR CONSTRUCTING INTEGRATED ORGANIZATIONS 420, 421,
424 (1995) (asserting that physicians have “more incentive to perform services than to manage
care” when they can charge fees to the withhold without internalizing the cost).
53. Latham, supra note 20, at 405 (citing PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM’N, 1995
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, reprinted in MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) No. 847,
extra ed., pt. 2, at 231–232 (1995)).
54. Latham, supra note 20, at 404–05.
55. See Pearson, supra note 48, at 692–93.
56. “Stop-loss” refers to a limit on financial risk of an individual physician or a physician
group accrued in caring for outlier patients with unusually high medical costs. Id. at 689. See
also Latham, supra note 20, at 407.
57. Pearson, supra note 48, at 689.
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incentives can affect the magnitude of physicians’ conflicts of interest.58 A
survey of HMO managers found that incentives constituting twenty-five
percent of a physician’s income created an extreme conflict of interest, but a
five to fifteen percent incentive could achieve desired outcomes without
compromising physicians’ judgment.59
Incentives play an important role for budgetary and cost reduction reasons.
Budget withholdings allow HMOs and IPAs to estimate earnings and
efficiently utilize resources over long periods. Incentives force physicians to
internalize the cost consequences of their decisions while maintaining
physician autonomy in treatment of individual patients.
III. PERCEPTIONS ABOUT PHYSICIAN FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
“It is well accepted that patients deserve medical opinions about treatment
plans and referrals unsullied by conflicting motives.”60 Ethically, medicine is
founded on the collective belief that physicians are competent, compassionate
professionals, acting solely for their patients’ best interests.61 However, in a
market system, medical resources are scarce, and physicians must treat wisely.
Critics of incentive programs argue that paying physicians more to do less may
create an irresistible temptation.62
The federal government seeks to protect consumers by providing
information to encourage informed decision making.63 In 1996, President
Clinton created the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality
in the Health Care Industry [hereinafter Commission], which advised the
President on changes in the health-care system and recommended measures “to
promote and assure health care quality and value, and protect consumers and
workers in the health care system.”64 The Commission submitted the
Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities to the President recommending
required disclosure of “network characteristics”65 and “procedures that govern
58. See Alan L. Hillman et al., HMO Managers’ Views On Financial Incentives and Quality,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1991, at 210.
59. Pearson, supra note 48, at 691.
60. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CURRENT OPINIONS
OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION 1986, § 8.06, at 31 (requiring the patient’s best interests to be the physician’s
primary concern), available at http://www.ama-assn.org.
61. Pearson, supra note 48, at 689. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
62. Pearson, supra note 48, at 689.
63. HEALTH, EDUC., AND HUMAN SERV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO.
HEHS-98-137, CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION: MANY QUALITY COMMISSION
DISCLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT CURRENT PRACTICE 4 (1998) [hereinafter
CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION].
64. Exec. Order No. 13,017, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,659 (Sept. 5, 1996).
65. “Network Characteristics” consist of “[p]rovider compensation methods, including base
payment (e.g., capitation, salary, fee schedule) and additional financial incentives (e.g., bonus,
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access to specialists.”66 The Commission advocated disclosure to entitle
consumers to “receive accurate, easily understood information and . . .
assistance in making informed health care decisions about their health plans,
professionals and facilities.”67
Disclosure regulation became more frequent in the 1990s as the health
insurance industry rapidly changed and regulators sought accountability
through disclosure.68 The Commission found that market-based and ethical
reasons should govern disclosure because value-based purchasing enables
consumers to maximize their dollar by seeking the highest quality care at the
lowest price.69 Patients and providers require disclosure because they rely on
plan information in decision making that directly affects the consumer’s life
and health.70
Disclosure is an effective regulatory strategy to expose conflicts of interest
when intermediaries or agents are involved.71 The greatest disagreement
between health-care providers and plan providers arises over business
relationships and financial arrangements.72 In a 1998 report to selected
Senators, the GAO found that large employers disclosed about half the
information recommended by the Commission but did not disclose physician
incentives in plan enrollment material.73 Health plan providers usually resist
disclosure because they view utilization review and physician incentives as
proprietary information.74

withholds, etc.).” ADVISORY COMM’N ON CONSUMER PROT. & QUALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE
INDUS., CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 1, at http://www.hcquality
commission.gov/final (last modified June 24, 1998) [hereinafter CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES]. See also CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION, supra note 63, at 7–8.
66. CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 65 at 1.
67. Id.
68. See Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 281
JAMA 1424, 1424 (1999). See also CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION, supra note 63, at
1.
69. CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 65 at 1.
70. Id.
71. Miller & Sage, supra note 68, at 1424–25 (advocating mandatory disclosure only when a
market failure results from “incomplete or asymmetric information,” the information would be
useful to consumers when making health-care choices, and barriers exist to restrict the voluntary
disclosure).
72. CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION, supra note 63, at 6–7.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Miller & Sage, supra note 68, at 1425.
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Patients’ Views are Mixed About the Financial Incentive Plans

The public’s misgivings about managed care focus on “the fear that patient
care is influenced by financial incentives.”75 Even though physician financial
incentives may not affect the actual administration of care, it may negatively
affect the patient’s overall perception of health-care quality.76
The opportunity for or mere appearance of conflict of interest reduces
patient trust and causes patients to scrutinize and second-guess their
physicians’ decisions.77 “Regardless of payment method, patients’ trust in
their health plan or HMOs was lower than trust in their physicians.”78
Patients’ trust in their HMO is closely correlated with trust in their physician.79
A study of patient and doctor opinions of financial incentive plans in the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) found “the adverse
impact of capitation on patient trust may be partially due to differences in
physician behavior.”80 The JAMA study found that the presence of financial
incentives enhances “discordance between patients’ experience and
expectations” and may reduce trust in their physician, regardless of whether
incentives encouraged more appropriate uses of medical services.81 A study in
the Archives of Internal Medicine confirmed the JAMA study results, finding
that although forty-six percent of patients surveyed were uncomfortable with
group capitation, trust in their primary care physician was not reduced by such
knowledge.82
Not only patients but also Congress and consumer rights groups advocate
for greater disclosure to facilitate informed decision making by consumers.83
However, it is important to note that “consumer satisfaction may not always

75. Julie Appleby, Kaiser to Reveal Incentives for Physicians; Bonuses for Limiting
Appointments Dropped, USA TODAY: MONEY, Jan. 24, 2003.
76. Anne G. Pereira & Steven D. Pearson, Patient Attitudes Toward Physician Financial
Incentives, 161 ARCHIVE OF INTERNAL MED. 1313, 1313 (2001).
77. See id.
78. Audiey C. Kao et al., The Relationship Between Method of Physician Payment and
Patient Trust, 280 JAMA 1708, 1711 (1998) (finding no association between patients’ trust and
their perception of capitation compared to fee-for-service payments).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1712.
81. Id. at 1713; but see Mark A. Hall et al., How Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives
Affects Trust, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 197, 204 (finding that disclosure of the mere
existence of financial incentives negatively affected patients’ perceptions, but when patients
understood the content of disclosure, their perceptions were positively affected).
82. Pereira & Pearson, supra note 76, at 1316.
83. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (containing
a list of disclosure requirements for private insurers under Medicare + Choice plans). See also
CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION, supra note 63, at 5.
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correlate with achievement of the desired clinical outcome.”84 Incentive
proponents argue that incentives are often complicated and disclosure only
distorts the patient’s understanding of complex health-care financing.85
Experts advocate disclosure in some form but disagree about its effectiveness
because of the difficulty of conveying complex information and measuring
patient reaction to potentially controversial payment structures.86 Knowledge
of positive incentives may dispel negative opinions, 87 but it also risks blurring
the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient because patients know
their physicians are acting with more than one loyalty.
Patients tended to be more satisfied with the non-financial aspects of feefor-service coverage88 but preferred the smaller co-pays and deductibles of
HMOs.89
The potential conflict of interest bothered patients most.90
Ultimately, patients’ concerns about premiums and covered benefits
outweighed misgivings regarding payment method and referral policies until
they contracted a serious illness or required expensive procedures.91
B.

Physician Autonomy Constrained by Financial Incentives

Not only are patients less satisfied, but physicians feel their ability to treat
patients, using their best judgment, is reduced in capitated systems.92
Physician financial incentives present the opportunity for conflicts of interest
in that the physician’s professional medical judgment may become clouded by
financial self-interest.93 The physician-patient relationship often facilitates an
atmosphere where the patient is reluctant to initiate conflict or question the
physician’s judgment because the patient must rely on the physician’s
In the physician-patient fiduciary
professional medical judgment.94

84. R. Adams Dudley et al., The Impact of Financial Incentives on Quality of Health Care,
76 MILBANK Q. 649, 651 (1998).
85. See generally Hall, supra note 81, at 204.
86. Id. at 202.
87. See id. at 203. In January 2003, Kaiser Permanente, the largest managed care provider in
the country, agreed to disclose clinical guidelines for treating certain conditions and physician
compensation—including physician financial incentives to limit care—as part of a legal
settlement. Laura B. Benko, A Look Inside: Settlement Requires Kaiser Permanente to Publish
Info on Doc’s Decisionmaking, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 27, 2003, at 8.
88. Non-financial aspects of fee-for-service coverage include: choice of provider, no
network restrictions, and personal relationship with primary-care physician.
89. Dudley, supra note 84, at 673.
90. Pereira & Pearson, supra note 76, at 1316.
91. Audiey C. Kao et al., Physician Incentives and Disclosure of Payment Methods to
Patients, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 181, 186 (2001).
92. Kao, supra note 78, at 1712.
93. See Miller & Sage, supra note 68, at 1425.
94. See id.
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relationship, the physician is obligated to “act exclusively in [the] patients’
interests” and “to respect the patients’ autonomy.”95
Primary care physicians reported that quality of care provided “through
capitated contracts is inferior to the care” provided under “other forms of
insurance.”96 The success of physician financial incentive plans may rest in
the contract language that binds primary care physicians’ interests to the HMO
instead of the patient’s welfare. One plan required physicians “not to take any
action . . . which undermines . . . confidence of enrollees.”97 Yet the next
paragraph of the contract required physicians to “keep the Proprietary
Information [payment rates, utilization-review procedures, incentives, etc.] and
this Agreement strictly confidential.”98
In reality, physicians feel restricted by malpractice fears rather than
payment systems. Physicians are worried about making the correct diagnosis
and cannot keep straight which patients are managed care and which are feefor-service. Few physicians contract with only one payor and accordingly
accept a medley of payment options.99 Physicians often experience four to five
distinct types of third-party reimbursement in a typical day and may spend
minimal time with each patient.100 In practice, physicians treat a variety of feefor-service, government supported, and capitation arrangements in the same
day. Keeping up with which patients are capitated may be a daunting task and
one which the physician chooses to avoid completely.
The effects of outliers in one plan can be reduced by increasing the
incentive time period or increasing the number of patients or physicians
calculated in the incentive.101 If incentives are paid less often, physicians feel
the incentive to ration treatment less intensely with each patient.102 As much
as providers and consumers dislike capitation, it is unlikely to be abandoned in
a market-driven health-care system with limited resources.103
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF ERISA PROVISIONS
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Investment Securities
Act (ERISA) to establish uniform standards for employee benefit plans. 104

95. Id. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
96. Dudley, supra note 84, at 657.
97. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk — The New Corporate
Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1706, 1706 (1995).
98. Id.
99. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 971.
100. Id.
101. Latham, supra note 20, at 410.
102. See id.
103. Pearson, supra note 48, at 689.
104. Employee Retirement Investment Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) [hereinafter
ERISA].
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Concerned that multi-state employers would be subjected to widely varying
obligations, Congress established uniform regulation under ERISA.105 With
ERISA’s enactment, Congress sought to promote judicial efficiency and
economic stability because federal and state laws messily interact in the area of
employee benefits.106
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that federal law supercedes
state law when Congress so desires.107 Congress may pre-empt all state law in
an area by expressing intent to completely exclude all others from regulating in
that area.108 However, the federal and state laws often coexist when Congress’
intent is unclear or it does not completely pre-empt a field. The Court
presumes that Congress does not intend to pre-empt state legislation unless
there is a clear indication from the language of the statute or purposes of the
federal action.109 Although Congress rarely expresses intent to pre-empt
existing state law, parts of ERISA completely pre-empt state law, while others
coexist in relative harmony.110
A.

Fiduciary Relationships Under Common Law

Trust plays a very important role in medical relationships, setting the stage
for every treatment decision.111 At common law, a trustee “is not permitted to
place himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his
duty to the beneficiaries.”112 Trust between physician and patient is more
complex than other fiduciary relationships113 because treatment decisions may
affect the patient’s survival or long-term health.114 At common law, all
fiduciary obligations were imposed on physicians, including requirements to:
disclose material information, use good faith and fair dealings with patients,
maintain confidentiality, provide notice to terminate the relationship, and avoid
divided loyalty.115 The physician-patient relationship embodies the definition
105. See id. See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990).
106. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1001; GARY CLAXTON, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW
PRIVATE INSURANCE WORKS: A PRIMER 7 (2002).
107. See U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
108. See id.
109. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 148, 157 (1978).
110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1132, 1144 (2000); see also CLAXTON, supra note 106, at 7
(discussing the nature of interaction between federal and state law regarding employee benefits).
111. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 485 (2002); see also
David Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical Care, 23 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 661, 661–62 (1998).
112. 2A AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170, at 311
(4th ed. 1987).
113. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
114. See generally Hall, supra note 111, at 485.
115. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (discussing fiduciary’s responsibility to
disclose material information and use good faith and fair dealing with beneficiary); Hammonds v.
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of trust-based relationships because the physician possesses knowledge to act
in the patient’s best interest and the patient may be none the wiser if the
physician breaches the fiduciary relationship.116
Courts must be careful to maintain a high level of trust between physician
and patient. Courts can view the effect of trust on law in three categories:
predicated, supportive, and skeptical.117 In a predicated view, trust is a factual
premise used to impose a particular rule.118 However, when implementing the
supportive attitude toward trust, courts “attempt to increase or sustain trust.”119
Finally, under the skeptical legal attitude, courts examine the “absence or
illegitimacy of trust” to establish a legal system institutionalizing distrust.120
Courts seek to regulate trustworthiness of physicians and institutions more
than influencing patients’ trust.121 Conflicts of interest created by HMO
reimbursement systems raise three trust-related legal issues. Under Hall’s
predicated theory, “the law might view patient trust as creating a fiduciary
relationship in which doctors have a duty to avoid or disclose financial
conflicts of interest, in order to justify the level of trust that exists.”122 The
existence of a fiduciary relationship causes the obligation to disclose to “flow
automatically,” regardless of positive or negative outcomes associated with
disclosure.123 Implementing a “supportive view” of incentives, a functionalist
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (discussing rules for termination of
fiduciary relationship); McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir.
1995) (explaining the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to the beneficiary); Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F.
Supp. 463, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
116. See Susan Dorr Goold, Money and Trust: Relationships Between Patients, Physicians,
and Health Plans, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 687, 687 (1998).
Typically, vulnerability, dependence, and reliance on the part of trustors force them or
cause them to choose to trust the trustee. There is a trust object with which the trustee is
entrusted: one’s health, life, well-being, or children. There are expectations of
competence or good outcome, and expectations of agency, beneficence, and good will that
apply to the trustee. The trustee, for her part, must accept the trusting relationship and the
discretionary power and control that comes with it. With this acceptance come moral
obligations of competence, agency, and good will.
Id.
117. Hall, supra note 111, at 486.
118. Id. (discussing predicated attitudes focused on formalistic reasoning based on the
existence of trust and disregarding the effects of trust).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 504 (finding that “[t]rust . . . is an attitude about motivations and expected
outcomes” held by the patient, but trustworthiness refers to behavior of physicians and
institutions).
122. Hall, supra note 111, at 486. “Trust predicates law in a justificatory mode by creating
legal rules to vindicate the level of trust that exists or to punish violations of that trust. In the
syllogistic mode, legal doctrine arises axiomatically from the existence of trust, through the
application of precedents and principles from fiduciary law.” Id.
123. Id. at 486.
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court might limit incentives or mandate disclosure because “conflicts of
interest created by cost-containment incentives tend to weaken trust by causing
patients . . . to question their doctors’ motivations.”124 From a skeptical
viewpoint, it appears that patients’ trust is unlikely to be maintained in the
presence of financial conflicts of interest.125
B.

Fiduciary Relationships Under ERISA

Congress adopted the scope of fiduciary responsibilities in ERISA to
govern employee benefit plan126 administration from the common law of
trusts.127 An individual is a fiduciary under ERISA if he “exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets,” or “has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan.”128 ERISA mandates that
private pension plan investments are to be held in trust,129 used for the
exclusive benefit of plan beneficiaries, and administered by one or more
named fiduciaries.130 However, ERISA fiduciary rules focus more on the
employer, insurance provider, or managed care organization than the
physician-patient relationship and “[u]nder ERISA . . . a fiduciary may have
financial interests adverse to beneficiaries.”131

124. Id.
125. See id. “Disclosure in such a case would serve as a warning to patients, putting them on
guard about how financial incentives might distort or corrupt their physicians’ medical
judgments.” Id.
126. Employee benefit plans as defined by ERISA include:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer . . . to the
extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship
or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). See also McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234,
236 (5th Cir. 1995).
127. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 11–13 (1973).
128. ERISA § 402(21)(A) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000)). A plan
fiduciary need not be a third party and can be an officer, employee, or other party in interest.
ERISA § 408(c)(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2000)).
129. See ERISA § 403(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000)).
130. See ERISA § 402(a)(1) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000)).
131. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000) (explaining that employers can be ERISA
fiduciaries and take actions which disadvantage employees when acting as employers or plan
beneficiaries).
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Courts disagree about whether ERISA creates a fiduciary duty for
managed care organizations to disclose financial incentives.132 In order to
maintain trustworthiness, ERISA implements a prudent person standard of care
in plan administration, requiring fiduciaries to discharge duties solely for the
interests of the plan beneficiaries.133 Fiduciaries must also provide services to
beneficiaries and defray costs of administering the plan.134 Fiduciaries must
act with “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” to minimize risk in investments
and enforce all portions of the benefit plan in compliance with ERISA.135 In
order for an employee to prove a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, he
must prove “breach of a fiduciary duty and a prima facie case of loss to the
[benefit] plan.”136 Finally, plan fiduciaries violating ERISA are personally
liable to the plan beneficiaries for losses incurred by the breach of duty.137
C. ERISA Analysis: Created by Congress and Redefined by the Courts
Two types of pre-emption can occur under ERISA: express pre-emption
under §514138 and procedural pre-emption under §502.139 ERISA § 514
requires courts to employ a three step test to determine whether a state law is
preempted by ERISA and should be removed to federal court.140 ERISA
analysis contains three major components: A state law is pre-empted if it
“relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan,141 but it can be “saved” if the claim

132. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that ERISA § 404
required managed care organization to disclose physician incentive plan); but see Ehlmann v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552, 554–56 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding no broad duty
to disclose for HMOs under ERISA).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
170(1) (1959).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)–(D).
136. McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995).
137. See ERISA § 409 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000)).
138. ERISA § 514 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000)); see infra note 140 and
accompanying text.
139. ERISA § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000)) (providing a private
right of action to recover for “benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan”).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (“provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”); Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983) (“[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the
normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan”); see also
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 722 (1985). A state law “relates to” an EBP if it
mandates benefit structure, mandates plan administration, rules out choice of benefit structure or
administration of an EBP, or mandates alternative enforcement mechanisms beyond those
provided by ERISA § 502. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 645–48 (1995) [hereinafter Travelers].
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relates to regulation of insurance,142 unless the plan is provided by a selfinsurer, in which case the plan is “deemed” not to be regulated as an insurer.143
ERISA § 502 is the exclusive remedy “to recover benefits due . . . under the
terms of his plan.”144
1.

Conflict Preemption — “Relating To” Doctrine

In 1974, Congress expressed intent to establish uniform regulation of
employee benefit plans (EBP) by enacting the Employee Retirement
Investment Securities Act (ERISA). Congress created ERISA to “minimize
the administrative and financial burden” faced by large insurers and employers
and to prevent potential conflicts of substantive law that would require
manipulating plans to comply with discrepancies in each jurisdiction.145
Congress used broad language in structuring ERISA to pre-empt all state
statutes that “relate to” an EBP.146 However, the Supreme Court has
continually narrowed the scope of ERISA preemption.147

In trying to extrapolate congressional intent in a case like this, when congressional
language seems simultaneously to preempt everything and hardly anything, we “have no
choice” but to temper the assumption that “the ordinary meaning . . . accurately expresses
the legislative purpose” . . . with the qualification “that the historic police powers of the
States were not [meant] to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 (2002) (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at
655) (finding that Illinois’ mandatory external review did not constitute alternative enforcement
measures to ERISA § 502) (citations omitted). The courts have continually narrowed the scope
of automatic pre-emption originally envisioned. Compare Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224
(2000), and Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001) (holding mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions as well as strictly treatment decisions are not pre-empted and should be handled through
state malpractice actions; however, plan coverage decisions are pre-empted), with Estate of
Frappier v. Wishnov, 678 So. 2d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing vicarious liability
claims, but pre-empting corporate liability claims), and Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d
350 (3d Cir. 1995) (establishing liability for HMO under ERISA § 502 for insufficient quantity of
services, but expressing an unwillingness to evaluate the quality of benefits).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”);
see also Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339–342 (2003) (adopting a
clarified test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance”).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (creating an exception to the insurance saving clause that an
employer’s self-insured benefit plan may not “be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance . . . of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies, [or] insurance contracts”).
144. ERISA § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000)).
145. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144).
146. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658. See also supra note 141.
147. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (limiting recovery under
ERISA to remedies outlined by Congress “without embellishment by independent state
remedies”); McClendon, 498 U.S. at 138; Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–
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A state-law cause of action is removable when it is based on law that is
pre-empted by ERISA and falls within the scope of enforceable remedies under
ERISA § 502 provisions.148 In Travelers, the Court redefined a two-prong
disjunctive test whereby a state statute triggers ERISA when it expressly
makes reference to an EBP or has a direct economic “connection with” an
EBP.149 The Court should look at both Congress’s objectives as to the scope of
ERISA preemption and to the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.150 In
Travelers, the Court held that surcharges mandated by New York law on
commercial insurers, but not Blue Cross/Blue Shield, were not pre-empted
because the charges only had an indirect economic impact.151 The Blues
accept patients through open enrollment, some of whom commercial insurers
would reject.152 Surcharges on commercial insurers and HMOs make the
Blues a “less unattractive” insurance alternative, and the Court reasoned that
this indirect economic effect does not have a connection with the uniform
administration of employee benefit plans.153 The Travelers Court also held
that state law mandating benefit structure, plan administration, or providing
alternative remedies to ERISA § 502 would have a connection with employee
benefit plans and trigger pre-emption.154
In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that incentive plans do not violate
ERISA, but the Court reserved judgment on determining the legality of failures
to disclose incentives.155 The Court outlined a test to settle disagreement about
pre-emption of state claims, holding that eligibility decisions are pre-empted,
but treatment decisions and mixed questions of eligibility and treatment are not
pre-empted.156 “[I]n the field of health care, a subject of traditional state
regulation, there is no ERISA preemption without clear manifestation of
congressional purpose.”157 Herdrich brought claims against Pegram, her
doctor, alleging medical malpractice, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty under

157 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983); Rush Prudential HMO,
Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (holding that states maintain powers unless Congress
expresses “clear and manifest purpose” to supercede).
148. See 28 U.S.C § 1331; 28 U.S.C § 1441; ERISA § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C
§ 1132 (2000)); see also Romney v. Lin, 94 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1996).
149. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658.
150. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., 519 U.S. 316,
325 (1997).
151. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658–59.
152. Id. at 658.
153. Id. at 659–60.
154. Id. at 658; see also Anderson v. Humana, 24 F.3d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
Anderson’s attacks on Humana-Michael Reese’s incentive structure was pre-empted because it
“relates to” the administration of employer’s benefit plan).
155. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
156. Id. at 231–32.
157. Id. at 237.
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ERISA.158 The Court determined that Dr. Pegram’s decision to delay an
ultrasound to detect appendicitis was not pre-empted by ERISA because it was
a mixed question of eligibility and treatment.159
Applying the Pegram analysis, the Second Circuit held that ERISA does
not pre-empt a claim challenging an “allegedly flawed medical judgment”
because review of an individual patient’s symptoms is a question of mixed
eligibility and treatment.160 Federal courts must tread lightly around state
medical malpractice law when considering ERISA claims because ERISA’s
main focus is on protecting contractual rights defined within individual
employee benefit plans.161
2.

Insurance Savings Clause

In order to qualify under the ERISA Insurance Saving Clause, a state law
must be “specifically directed toward” the insurance industry and not merely a
general law that affects the industry.162 ERISA’s Insurance Saving Clause
does not “exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”163 Prior to 2003, courts applied an
unworkable test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance” by
applying a common-sense definition or examining the McCarran-Ferguson
criteria.164 Under McCarran-Ferguson, courts found a state law pre-empted if
it met two of the three McCarran-Ferguson factors: whether the practice—
”transfer[s] or spread[s] a policyholder’s risk; . . .is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; . . . [and] is limited to
entities within the insurance industry.”165
In 2003, the Court abandoned the McCarran-Ferguson criteria in favor of a
two-pronged test to redefine the “regulate insurance” clause, holding that the
scope of the Insurance Savings Clause is “specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance” and “the state law must substantially affect the risk
pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”166 The Supreme
Court unanimously held that Kentucky’s any willing provider law was not pre-

158. Id. at 215–16.
159. Id. at 229, 231 (defining a mixed eligibility and treatment decision as an “eligibility
decision[] [that] cannot be untangled from physicians’ judgments about reasonable medical
treatment”).
160. Cicio v. Does 1–8 et al., 321 F.3d 83, 102 (2d Cir. 2003).
161. Id. at 100.
162. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365–66; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987).
163. ERISA § 514 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000)).
164. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985).
165. Id. at 743; see also McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1994)).
166. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1479 (2003).
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empted by ERISA because it was “specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance,” even though the statutes also adversely affected
physicians from entering into HMO contracts.167
3.

The Deemer Clause

In the final step of ERISA analysis, a self-insuring company shall be
“deemed”168 to be exempt from the Insurance Savings clause and not subject to
state law regulating insurance, banking, and securities.169 The Deemer Clause
in effect subjects self-insured employers to federal law but exempts them from
state laws regulating insurers.
D. Complete/Procedural Pre-emption
Complete pre-emption under ERISA § 502 arises when a beneficiary seeks
“to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan.”170 Remedies mandated for ERISA plans do not
allow for tort or punitive damage awards and only allow injunctive relief and
incidental damages occurring from denial of benefits under an EBP.171 ERISA
§ 502 requirements172 must be strictly adhered to and will completely pre-empt
any state law to the contrary, providing a defendant the right to remove to
federal court if a claim for benefits is filed in state court.173 ERISA plaintiffs
are not entitled to trial by jury.174
ERISA § 502 creates statutory legal rights, which when infringed upon
provide beneficiaries with standing and satisfy the actual or threatened injury

167. Id. at 1475–76, 1479.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
169. A mandatory benefits statute affecting a self-insuring company’s EBP will be preempted because it “relates to” employee benefits. However, the plan will be “saved” because it
relates to insurance and will be subject to state statutes. One further exception exists (the Deemer
Clause) in that self-insured employers are “deemed” not to be regulated by state statutes as an
insurance company or under insurance contracts and therefore pre-empted by ERISA. See
generally 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
170. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000)).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1)–(2) (2000). Requirements include: a full and fair internal review
because an employee has the right to know reasons behind a Managed Care Organization’s
decision; a written denial explaining the reason; time limits for decisions (Urgent–72 hours,
Concurrent–sufficiently in advance, Pre-service–15 days, Post-service–30 days); the provision of
an “Appropriate Health Care Professional” on appeal to aid in decision; and exhaustion of
internal review before plaintiffs can file a claim in federal court. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-1(f)(2)(i)–(iii) (2003).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 1132; see also 29 U.S.C § 1441 (2000).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
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requirement of Article III.175 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals even held
that plaintiffs do not have to allege actual injuries to prosecute ERISA
violations because fiduciaries are liable for breaches of duty even when no
actual injury exists.176 Plaintiffs may seek equitable relief under ERISA § 502
but may not bring an action for legal relief unless actual harm can be proven.177
ERISA § 502 requires plaintiffs to exhaust all pre-filing requirements
before pursuing litigation.178 Plaintiffs possess a statutory right to have a full
and fair internal review, but if that comes back against the patient, states can
enact binding external review, which will stand up against ERISA
preemption.179
Courts will give deference to plan administrators’ decisions and review §
502 claims using an arbitrary and capricious standard as long as plan
administrator is given the discretionary authority to determine or construe the
terms of the plan.180 However, where a plan administrator has a conflict of
interest, the court will give less deference and weigh the conflict as a “factor in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.”181 In Doe v. Group
Hospitalization & Medical Services, Blue Cross administered the benefit plan,
but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a conflict of interest existed
because Blue Cross (an insurer) profited less if more medical services were
approved.182 After determining the existence of a conflict of interest, the court
looks to see whether the contract is ambiguous.183 If a conflict of interest
exists and the contract is ambiguous, the court should construe terms in the
patient’s favor.184
175. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
176. Ziegler v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1990) (“not all ERISA
actions for breach of fiduciary duties require an occurrence of harm before they will accrue”); see
also ERISA § 404(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)) (A fiduciary who fails to
perform for the exclusive benefit of participants violates ERISA).
177. Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 2003); see also
Larson v. Northrop Corp., 21 F.3d 1164, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)–(b). Exhaustion of pre-filing requirements entails obtaining written
denial explaining the reason for denial and a full and fair internal review. Id.; see also supra note
172.
179. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379–380 (2002) (allowing external
reviewer to determine what constitutes “medically necessary,” thus providing expanded
opportunity for recovering on a claim for benefits due under an employee benefits plan, but still
limited to remedies under ERISA); 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1)–(2) (2000).
180. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) [hereinafter Firestone
Tire]. However, if deference is not given to the plan administrator, claims will be reviewed de
novo. Id. at 115.
181. Id. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)).
182. 3 F.3d 80, 85–87 (4th Cir. 1993).
183. Id. at 88–89.
184. Id. at 89 (noting that if no conflict of interest exists or the contract is not ambiguous, then
the plan administrator is given wide discretion and the courts will only review for abuse).
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V. CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS DISAGREE ABOUT FIDUCIARIES’ DUTY TO
DISCLOSE UNDER ERISA
Whether an HMO has a duty to disclose information regarding physician
financial incentives and is classified as an ERISA fiduciary depends on the
contract language of the individual plan and the federal court in which the
action is initiated.
A.

Cases Finding Requirement in ERISA for HMOs to Disclose Physician
Financial Incentives as Material Information
1.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: Shea v. Esensten

In 1997, the Eighth Circuit employed a functionalist approach in Shea v.
Esensten, broadly interpreting the ERISA § 514 “relates to” test.185 Shea’s
husband died after reporting chest pain to his primary-care physician.186 She
had standing under ERISA to pursue the claim because Mr. Shea’s employer
contracted with Seagate HMO to provide medical coverage.187 The physician
refused to give a referral to a cardiologist even when the decedent offered to
pay for the visit out of pocket.
The Shea Court reasoned that the outcome of the case would affect
administration of the employee benefit plan and accordingly “related to” an
EBP.188 State laws relating to ERISA must be interpreted broadly and preempted because if administrators have to amend their benefit plans for each
state, the result would be contrary to Congress’s intent for “nationally uniform
administration of employee benefit plans.”189
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Seagate HMO breached its
fiduciary duty because it did not disclose “material information” regarding its
physician incentive program which encouraged rationing care and minimizing
specialist referrals.190 “From the patient’s point of view, a financial incentive
scheme put in place to influence a treating doctor’s referral practices when the
patient needs specialized care is certainly a material piece of information.”191
The court reasoned that if Mr. Shea had known his physician was receiving
185. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997);
see also ERISA § 514 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000)).
186. Shea, 107 F.3d at 626.
187. Id. at 626–27.
188. Id. at 627; Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that
breach of fiduciary duty occurs when harm results from non-disclosure material information to
the beneficiary); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
189. 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
142 (1990).
190. Shea, 107 F.3d at 628. But see Pegram v. Herdrich 530 U.S. 211, 231 (2000) (discussing
Congress’ intent for treatment of HMOs in mixed eligibility decisions).
191. Shea, 107 F.3d at 628.
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financial kickbacks for not referring patients to specialists, he would have
scrutinized his physician’s decision more closely and sought a second
opinion.192
The Shea rationale for evaluating ERISA claims survives after Pegram’s
“mixed eligibility” test because the Eighth Circuit decided this case on the
basis of the HMO’s fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404. Shea would no
longer be viable if the Eighth Circuit had relied on an examination of the
physician’s treatment decision and the HMOs administrative decision because
the case would have remained in state court, on the original malpractice
claims, under the “mixed eligibility” test.193 ERISA issues would then be
brought into state court actions through supplemental jurisdiction.194 However,
the Eighth Circuit ruled on fiduciary duty grounds, thus providing multiple
avenues for holding HMOs liable for nondisclosure under ERISA.
2.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: McDonald v. Provident Indemnity
Life Insurance Co.

The Fifth Circuit found that fiduciary duties imposed under ERISA § 404
required disclosure of “material information” such as a change in the plan’s
rate schedule that resulted in “prohibitive premiums.”195 To prove breach of
fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must show “a breach of fiduciary duty and a prima
facie case of loss to the plan.”196 The burden then shifts to the fiduciary to
prove that losses to the plan were not caused by breach of fiduciary duty.197
In McDonald, the plaintiff owned a small construction business and
challenged the premium increases, imposed by the defendant, which forced
McDonald to cancel coverage for employees.198 French, the fiduciary,
breached his fiduciary duty when he failed to inform McDonald and its
employees of rate adjustments planned by Provident, motivated at least in part
by marketing considerations.199 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that

192. Id. at 629.
193. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223–24, 231; ERISA § 404 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(A) (2000)).
194. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) and corresponding state statutes.
195. McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995). “Section
404(a) imposes on a fiduciary the duty of undivided loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries,
as well as a duty to exercise care, skill, prudence and diligence. An obvious component of those
responsibilities is the duty to disclose material information.” Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
196. McDonald, 60 F.3d at 237.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 236.
199. Id. at 237.
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plaintiffs’ claim failed the second step of the analysis because they could not
prove loss to the plan.200
B.

Cases Finding No Enumerated Duty in ERISA for HMOs to Disclose
Physician Financial Incentive Plans
1.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: Ehlmann v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan of Texas

In 2000, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a formalistic approach
in deciding that no duty to disclose physician financial incentives existed under
ERISA.201 In Ehlmann, the plaintiffs alleged that under ERISA § 404,202
Congress intended for a disclosure requirement to be imposed on plan
fiduciaries.203 The Ehlmann Court recognized the issue as one of first
impression and strictly construed ERISA’s statutory requirements.204 To
impose such a disclosure requirement would go beyond the scope of duties
Congress imposed on fiduciaries under ERISA and “this court will not
encroach on that authority by imposing a duty which Congress has chosen not
to impose.”205 The Fifth Circuit adopted an expressio unius est exclusio
alterius rationale in holding that the absence of disclosure requirements shows
that Congress and the Department of Labor intentionally omitted such
requirements.206
The court held that only “material information” must be disclosed to plan
beneficiaries207 and information regarding a financial incentive plan was not
considered “material” in the Fifth Circuit.

200. Id. at 237–38; ERISA § 409(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000)); see
also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985) (holding that the loss must be
to the plan and not simply to individual beneficiaries).
201. Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 2000).
202. See ERISA § 404 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000)).
203. Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 555.
204. Id. at 554–55. But see Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 914 (1997); Swinney v. General Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518–19 (6th Cir. 1995);
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 531–32 (1996).
205. Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 554–55.
206. Id. at 555–56. “A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing
implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620–21 (8th
ed. 2004).
207. Compare Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 556, with Shea, 107 F.3d at 628, and McDonald v.
Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing between cases
finding nondisclosure of material information that breached the fiduciary duty and cases lacking a
specific inquiry or special circumstances to rise to the level of material information warranting
disclosure).
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan
East

In June 2003, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued the most recent
appellate decision, examining a new twist on liability for nondisclosure of
physician financial incentive plans. The opinion discussed the extent to which
ERISA § 404 fiduciary requirements obligate an HMO to disclose financial
incentives awarded to physicians.208 In Horvath, the plaintiff attempted to
stretch ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirements one step beyond where courts had
previously been willing to go.209
Horvath proceeded, not on the traditional “material information” theory of
Shea and McDonald,210 but instead sought injunctive relief for disclosure of
physician financial incentives and restitution or disgorgement for the
“diminished value” of the employee benefit plan.211 Horvath alleged that
nondisclosure of Keystone’s physician financial incentives to the plan
administrator (Horvath) violated the HMOs fiduciary duty to plan members
under ERISA and that restitution should be awarded for amounts overpaid by
employees.212 Beneficiaries contested paying into a plan that rewarded
physicians for rationing treatment while enrollees believed the physicians were
acting solely for benefit of patients, free from the conflicted influence of
financial incentives.213 Plaintiffs claimed the cost of the plan was overly
burdensome considering that physicians were receiving kickbacks to limit
care.214
A private cause of action exists for breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA215 because “appropriate equitable relief”216 must be granted “directly to

208. See Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2003), see also
ERISA § 404 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000)).
209. See Horvath, 333 F.3d at 450.
210. Strategically, Horvath’s decision not to proceed on the material information theory may
have been well-advised because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had already ruled
formalistically in Ehlmann that nondisclosure of physician financial incentives was not material
information. Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 556.
211. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 453. Under the “diminished value theory” Horvath alleged
damages resulting from the difference between the employees’ perceived value of a plan
including physician financial incentives versus a plan without incentives for rationing care. Id.
212. Id. at 453.
213. Id.
214. Compare Id. at 456–57, with McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234,
237 (5th Cir. 1995) (attempting to analogize the kickbacks in Horvath with the undisclosed rate
increases in McDonald).
215. See Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that failure to disclose “material information” upon request of beneficiary constituted
breach of HMOs fiduciary duty).
216. ERISA § 404(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000)), ERISA §
502(a)(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000)).
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a participant or beneficiary.”217 Neither party to this case heavily contested
whether Keystone qualified as a fiduciary under ERISA.218 A beneficiary need
not request information from the fiduciary before fiduciary duties under
ERISA are imposed.219 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals regarded Keystone
as an ERISA fiduciary and accordingly held that Horvath and other employees
were entitled to certain rights: 1) “to receive particular information” and 2) “to
have Keystone act in a fiduciary capacity.”220 The Third Circuit previously
held that an ERISA fiduciary must disclose “material facts, known to the
fiduciary but unknown to the beneficiary” and that must be known for
beneficiary’s protection.221
Horvath’s claim for injunctive relief demanded that employees receive
information regarding physician financial incentive plans when deciding
whether to enroll.222 She claimed Keystone’s concealment of details regarding
its physician incentive plans interfered with her duties as plan administrator.223
“Congress’ purpose in enacting the ERISA disclosure provisions [was to]
ensur[e] that the individual participant knows exactly where he stands with
respect to the plan.”224 Keystone claimed that it fulfilled ERISA’s fiduciary
duties because it provided a directory of physicians covered by the plan and
sent a letter to Horvath outlining its policy of “attempting to ‘control the
increase of health care costs through negotiated agreements with health care
providers, doctors, hospitals, pharmacy, and ancillary providers.’”225
Horvath sought equitable and legal relief in the form of “restitution,
disgorgement and an injunction barring Keystone from continuing to omit
information regarding physician incentives from its disclosures to plan
Horvath’s monetary damages for restitution and/or
members.”226

217. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
218. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 453 n.2.
219. Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc.,
93 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that disclosure must occur when fiduciary is on notice as to
certain information, disclosure of which would prevent a beneficiary’s misinformed or harmful
decision regarding an ERISA plan, but rejecting requirement that beneficiary make specific
inquiry).
220. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 456.
221. Glaziers, 93 F.3d at 1182; McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234,
237 (5th Cir. 1995); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997).
222. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 453; CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra
note 65 (emphasizing initial disclosure of benefit plan information to consumers because initial
choice of plan has significant impacts on future choices such as physicians, facilities, and
treatment options); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
223. See Horvath, 333 F.3d at 456; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1132(a)(3) (2000).
224. Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1148 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 118 (1989)).
225. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 453.
226. Id. at 455.
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disgorgement were dismissed by the court because she could not demonstrate
individual loss resulting from Keystone’s failure to disclose, nor could she
establish an amount she and other employees overpaid as a result of nondisclosure.227
The Third Circuit proceeded to the merits of the injunctive relief claim
because violation of ERISA § 404 fiduciary duties entitles a plaintiff to relief
and satisfies Article III injury requirements.228 The court previously held that a
claim could be sustained if the plaintiffs established a “tangible economic
harm” and could show that “health care they received under [the] plan actually
was compromised or diminished as a result of . . . management decisions
challenged in the complaint.”229
The Third Circuit held that Horvath could not sustain a cause of action
against her HMO for breach of fiduciary duty for failure to disclose physician
financial incentives because the HMO had no duty to disclose that
information.230 ERISA imposes no disclosure requirements on HMOs
regarding physician incentives unless a plan participant requests such
information or circumstances exist to put the HMO on notice that disclosure of
such information may prevent the participant from making a harmful decision
with respect to her health-care coverage.231 Absent evidence she was harmed
as a result of not having such information disclosed, Horvath’s claim must
fail.232 Horvath did not properly request information regarding physician
incentive plans, and accordingly Keystone could not have known that the
information was necessary to avoid harm.233 Following a similar decision in
the Fifth Circuit,234 the court refused to add physician financial incentives to
the list of disclosures required by ERISA, but in doing so the court ignored
Eighth Circuit decisions to the contrary.235

227. Compare Horvath, 333 F.3d at 457, with McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co.,
60 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 1995). In order to sustain a claim for misrepresentation by an ERISA
fiduciary, a plaintiff must claim that: defendant was acting as a fiduciary, defendant made a
misrepresentation, the misrepresentation was material, and plaintiff relied on the
misrepresentation to her detriment. See Daniels v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 263 F.3d 66, 73 (3d
Cir. 2001).
228. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 456; see supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
229. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 488 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing physician financial
incentive plans challenged under RICO, but utilizing the same analysis); see also Shea v.
Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997).
230. Horvath, 333 F.3d 462–63.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000).
235. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
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VI. ANALYSIS OF DISCLOSURE DECISIONS BY THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS
Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc. was the latest decision in a
string of cases outlining the duties of HMOs to their beneficiaries.236 Horvath
involved a disclosure issue where a beneficiary challenged the disclosure
practices of her HMO, alleging that nondisclosure at initial enrollment and
continued concealment of physician incentive plan violated ERISA disclosure
rules and diminished the value of the health plan to employees.237 Horvath
urged the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to expand the disclosure requirements
under ERISA, but the court rejected her claim because it found that controlling
exploding health-care costs outweighed the protection which might be derived
from expanding existing ERISA disclosure rules.
The Horvath Court acknowledged that HMOs exist to establish costcontainment measures for providing medical coverage to employees and are
not inherently wrong.238 Relying on the Pegram analysis, the court found that
cost-controlling measures are balanced by the physicians’ “professional
obligation to provide covered services with a reasonable degree of skill and
judgment in the patient’s interest.”239 However, the court accepted the conflict
of interest inherent in managed care, recognizing that a physician’s incentive
under a HMO is to provide patients with less care, not more.240
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals erred in deciding Horvath’s case on
grounds other than fiduciary duty responsibilities. “ERISA does require,
however, that the fiduciary with two hats wear only one at a time, and wear the
fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions.”241 The Horvath Court’s
analysis should have focused on whether disclosure of Keystone’s physician
incentive plan was a “material fact[], known to the fiduciary but unknown to
the beneficiary,” 242 that Horvath and other employees should have known
about for their pecuniary protection.243
The Horvath Court ruled against the plaintiff because she failed to request
information from Keystone, Keystone was not on notice that disclosing
information was necessary to prevent plaintiff from making a harmful decision,
and the plaintiff failed to show how information on physician incentives was
236. See Horvath, 333 F.3d at 450.
237. Id. at 453.
238. Id. at 454 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000)).
239. Id. (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219).
240. See id.; see also Pegram 530 U.S. at 219; Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80
(4th Cir. 1993).
241. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225; see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443–44
(1999); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
242. Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc.,
93 F.3d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1996).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 217–27.
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material because her employer only offered one option for insurance
coverage.244 However, Supreme Court jurisprudence should put Keystone on
notice that non-disclosure of information that is essential to assist beneficiaries
in evaluating the quality of their health-care coverage may cause economic
harm.
It is likely that the United States Supreme Court will take up the issue of
physician financial incentives and the scope of ERISA’s disclosure rules. The
Court should look at the differing standards established by the Federal Courts
of Appeals and adopt a factors test to determine whether disclosure is
necessary in a particular situation. Establishing a bright-line test for
mandatory disclosures is unworkable because many different factors may come
into play in a court’s final decision. Factors considered by Federal Courts of
Appeals included the materiality of the information,245 whether a request was
made for information,246 whether concealment of the incentive plan caused the
beneficiary to make a health-care decision adverse to their health,247 the
occurrence of any adverse effects resulting from improper administrative
decisions,248 and schedule changes affecting the employer’s ability to provide
coverage.249 A factors test that weighs the many variables that determine
whether nondisclosure of physician incentive plans is appropriate will provide
the most flexibility for interpreting ERISA § 404 disclosure rules and will
allow the trial court to evaluate the merits of each case with a set of criteria to
weigh facts against.

244. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 462
245. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997);
Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that breach of fiduciary duty
occurs when harm results from non-disclosure material information to the beneficiary); Varity
Corp., 516 U.S. at 506 (1996) (discussing fiduciary’s responsibility to disclose material
information and use good faith and fair dealing with beneficiary); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Oh. 1965) (discussing rules for termination of fiduciary relationship);
McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co. 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining the
fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to the beneficiary); Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 469
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
246. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 461; Glaziers, 93 F.3d at 1181–82; Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters
Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that failure to disclose “material
information” upon request of beneficiary constituted breach of HMOs fiduciary duty).
247. Compare Horvath, 333 F.3d at 461, with Glaziers, 93 F.3d at 1181.
248. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (establishing liability for
HMO under ERISA § 502 for insufficient quantity of services, but expressing an unwillingness to
evaluate the quality of benefits); see Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001) (holding mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions as well as strictly treatment decisions are not pre-empted and
should be handled through state malpractice actions, but plan coverage decisions are pre-empted);
see also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000); Estate of Frappier v. Wishnov, 678 So.
2d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing vicarious liability claims but pre-empting corporate
liability claims).
249. McDonald, 60 F.3d at 234.
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The Court’s factors test may also include an examination of positive
incentives implemented by HMOs or administrators to encourage positive
outcomes in patient treatment. A new movement has been sweeping through
employer benefit plans whereby participating plans pay physicians bonuses for
improving the health of employees.250 Landro explained that physicians
receive yearly bonuses for adequately measuring and controlling a diabetic’s
blood pressure, blood sugar, and lipid levels.251 General Electric, Ford Motor
Company, UPS and Verizon were listed as employers participating in such a
plan.252 Positive physician incentive plans support the core concept behind
HMO’s: reducing costs by promoting healthy lifestyles through preventative
measures.
With the narrowing scope of ERISA pre-emption, state legislatures are
beginning to respond with initiatives to circumvent ERISA. California
recently enacted the California Health Insurance Act of 2003, which requires
all employers with fifty or more employees to offer employees and dependents
group health insurance or pay into a state health insurance pool.253 The fee is
waived for companies who provide at least a percentage of health insurance
coverage to employees.254 California’s statute is innovative because it skirts
the edges of ERISA jurisprudence. The California Health Insurance Act of
2003 does not regulate plan administration or mandate benefits; it merely
requires employers to provide coverage. Like the surcharges in Travelers, the
California Health Insurance Act of 2003 may only have an indirect economic
connection to employee benefit plans because it makes providing group health
coverage to employees a “less unattractive” option and may ultimately prove
more cost effective than paying into the state insurance pool.255 Even if the
California Health Insurance Act of 2003 is pre-empted, it may be saved in the
second step of the ERISA analysis.256 The Act may be saved if it is

250. See Laura Landro, Health Plans Try ‘Pay for Performance’ Rewards for Doctors, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 17, 2004, at A1.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. California Health Insurance Act of 2003, 2003 Cal. Stat. 673, S.B. 2 (requiring
California employers to pay a fee to the state to provide health insurance unless the employer
provides coverage directly, in which case the fee is waived).
254. Id.
255. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645 (1995). For example, buying into a spouse’s insurance policy may become more
attractive (or less unattractive) if the financial incentives diminish the value of a plan to the point
where payment into the employee’s plan is no longer desirable. See supra notes 151–56 and
accompanying text.
256. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1478–79 (2003); see supra
text accompanying notes 164–69.
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“specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance” and “substantially
affect[s] risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.”257
Even though physicians and patients are disgruntled about managed care
reimbursement, the Federal Courts of Appeals recognize that cost-conserving
measures in a health-care system with limited resources are desirable, and
physician financial incentives may be the least restrictive and most effective
control.258 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was willing to accept the risk of
lower quality health care in order to constrain health-care costs and allow
employers to provide insurance at a reasonable cost. 259
VII. CONCLUSION
The mere presence of financial incentives is not necessarily troubling.
However, the presence of financial incentives ought to be disclosed to
employees. Without information regarding their physician’s outside influences,
patients cannot be informed consumers and remain unable to fully evaluate a
situation that may affect their long-term health. Like Travelers, the presence
of financial incentives may make one employee benefit plan “less unattractive”
than others. Unless incentive plans are disclosed at enrollment, the consumer
will continue to be disadvantaged in his ability to evaluate costs and benefits
associated with each benefit option.
A balance must be struck between the policy to control inflationary healthcare costs and maintaining physicians’ obligations to “carry out that regimen
which, according to my power and discernment, shall be for the benefit of my
patients; I will keep them from harm and wrong.”260 Even though the courts
have not yet embraced the potential value of Horvath’s “diminished value”
theory, medical journals indicate that patients and medical professionals
appreciate that the appearance of a conflict of interest can cause as much of a
negative impact as an actual conflict. Horvath showed us just beyond where
the court was willing to go but outlined criteria that may be beneficial to
sustaining a diminished value theory in future litigation. To be sure, so long as
health-care costs skyrocket, courts, as a policy matter, will remain willing to
accept the risk of reduced quality health care in order to keep an eye on the
bottom line.
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